fines.kaiserpapers.info
This web site is in no manner affiliated with any Kaiser entity and the for profit Permanente Link for Translation of the Kaiser Papers PATHFINDER(search) | ABOUT US | CONTACT | WHY THE KAISERPAPERS | RESEARCH GUIDES BY SUBJECT | A READER'S GUIDE | Enforcement Action Against Kaiser Permanente 1 Second Amended Accusation 98-126, RGR JOAN W. CAVANAGH (#56708) Assistant Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement REBECCA G. RUGGERO (#165581) Senior Counsel JAMES NOVELLO (#172964) Staff Counsel CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 980 9th Street, Suite 500 Sacramento, CA 95814-2725 Telephone: (916) 323-0435 Facsimile: (916) 323-0438 Attorneys for Complainant BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE VS KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. (UTTERBACK) KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. (SPUNBARG) KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. (WEST) FILE NO: 98-126, 00-190 OAH NO: N2000070472 SECOND AMENDED ACCUSATION AND PETITION TO ASSESS ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AGAINST THE LICENSEE HEARING DATE: January 8, 2001 HEARING TIME: 9:00 am HEARING PLACE: 1515 Clay Street, Room 206, Oakland, California 94612 INTRODUCTION This case is brought pursuant to the provisions of the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Ac t of 1975, as amended (the "Act")1 based on the failure by Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. ("Kaiser"), the largest health care service plan in California, to provide three (now deceased) Kaiser enrollees, Margaret Utterback, Wolfgang Spunbarg, and James West with care and services as mandated by the Act. 1 The Act includes Health and Safety Code section 1340, et seq. Kaiser failed to provide Margaret Utterback with access to care, continuity of care consistent with good professional service, and basic health care services such as emergency care. Kaiser also failed, and continues to fail, to demonstrate that it has the organizational and administrative capacity to provide services to enrollees by maintaining, filing and maintaining medical records such as e-mail messages. Finally, Kaiser failed to promptly and reasonably resolve the family’s grievance. Specifically, Kaiser failed to coordinate Mrs. Utterback’s care after an x-ray indicated that follow up was necessary; failed, and continues to fail, to have a system in place for a medical professional to triage abdominal aortic aneurysm2 complaints; failed, and continues to fail, to have an appointment system that prioritizes appointments with physicians; failed to heed Mrs. Utterback’s repeated requests to see her physician once she arrived at a Kaiser clinic sooner than her scheduled appointment; and failed, and continues to fail, to have protocols in place regarding the use of emergency transport from a clinic to the emergency room to ensure patients are transferred timely and in accordance with their medical needs. Regarding Wolfgang Spunbarg, Kaiser failed to provide him with accessible health care services and continuity of care consistent with good professional service. Specifically, Kaiser failed to provide Mr. Spunbarg with timely and accessible emergency health care services for treatment of his abdominal aortic aneurysm. 2 An abdominal aortic aneurysm develops when weakness in the wall of the aortic artery causes the vessel to swell. Rupture or threatened rupture of an abdominal aneurysm is a surgical emergency. If the vessel bursts, the patient can bleed to death in a short period of time. The condition normally takes many years to develop. 3 Second Amended Accusation 98-126, RGR Regarding James West, Kaiser failed to provide him with continuity of care consistent with good professional service. Specifically Kaiser failed to share all pertinent information, including ready availability of medical records, relating to the health care of Mr. West. Kaiser’s conduct in its treatment of Mrs. Utterback, Mr. Spunbarg, and Mr. West was in violation of the Act and constitutes cause for discipline by the Director of the Department of Managed Health Care pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1386. PARTIES 1. Joan W. Cavanagh ("complainant") is the Assistant Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement of the Department of Managed Health Care. Complainant brings this action solely in her official capacity as Assistant Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement. 2. At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, Kaiser has been a health care service plan as defined by the Act. Kaiser is the holder of health care service plan license no. 933-0055, which was issued on November 4, 1977 by the Commissioner of Corporations of the State of California.3 Kaiser is subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act. Kaiser’s principal corporate office is located at 1800 Harrison Street, 8th Floor, Oakland, California 94612. 3.Until July 1, 2000, health care service plans were licensed by the Department of Corporations and subject to DOC’s regulatory jurisdiction. Effective July 1, 2000, the Department of Managed Health Care succeeded to allduties, powers, responsibilities and jurisdiction of the Department of Corporations regarding the Department of Corporation’s Health Plan Program, health care service plans and the health care service plan business. Health & Safety Code § 1341.9. As of January 1, 2001, the Department of Managed Care is now known as the Department of Managed Health Care. JURISDICTION 3. This Second Amended Accusation is brought before the Director of the Department of Managed Health Care (the "Department") under the authority of the following sections of the Health and Safety Code and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder at title 10, California Code of Regulations (the "Rules"). 4. Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1341, the Director is vested with the responsibility for administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder. The statutory mission of the Department as set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1341(a), is to ensure that health care service plans provide enrollees with access to quality health care services and to protect and promote the interests of enrollees. 5. Health and Safety Code section 1386(a) authorizes the Director to take disciplinary action against a health care service plan, including, but not limited to, the assessment of administrative penalties against the plan, if the Director determines, after appropriate notice and opportunity for a hearing, that the plan has committed any of the acts or omissions which constitute grounds for disciplinary action pursuant to the provisions of the Act. 6. Health and Safety Code section 1386(b)(6) provides that the Director may take disciplinary action against a plan when "[t]he plan has violated or attempted to violate, or conspired to violate, directly or indirectly, or assisted in or abetted a violation or conspiracy to violate any provision of this chapter, any rule or regulation adopted by the director pursuant to this chapter, or any order issued by the director." 7. As set forth below, complainant alleges that Kaiser has violated or continues to violate, Health and Safety Code sections 1367(d), 1367(e)(1), 1367(i), 1368.01(a) and 1368.04(b) and California Code of Regulations, title 10, sections 1300.67,1300.67(g), 1300.67.1, 1300.67.1(a), 1300.67.1(c), 1300.67.1(d), 1300.67.1(e),1300.67.2, 1300.67.2(c), 1300.67.2(d) and 1300.68. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Margaret Utterback 8. On January 26, 1996, Margaret Utterback, a 74-year-old member of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. experienced a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm ("AAA") at Kaiser Hospital in Hayward after attempting to see a physician for more than eight hours. The rupture occurred an hour after the initial diagnosis. Due to the fact that there was a unreasonable delay in getting Mrs. Utterback transported a mere one and one half miles from a Kaiser clinic to the Kaiser emergency room, the subsequent eight hour surgery which included transfusion of more than 20 units of blood proved futile. Mrs. Utterback died approximately 36 hours later in the critical care unit ("CCU"). 9. On January 26, 1996, Mrs. Utterback woke up suffering from right abdominal pain radiating to her back. The pain persisted throughout the entire day as she attempted to be seen by her Kaiser physician. She made continual efforts to obtain an appointment with her primary care physician. In doing so, Mrs. Utterback faithfully utilized the Hayward phone system and waited more than four hours to hear back from her physician, who answered her request to be seen with a prescription for a narcotic pain medication. After Mrs. Utterback refused the pain medication and insisted on being examined, her daughter drove her to Kaiser’s Point Eden medical facility in Hayward at least one hour early for her appointment, where Mrs. Utterback sat in the waiting room, moaning in obvious physical distress. Even though the receptionist was asked several times by her daughter to try to work Mrs. Utterback in earlier due to her mother’s severe pain, Kaiser nevertheless failed to have her examined by a doctor or nurse until approximately 4:30 p.m., 15 minutes after her scheduled appointment. 10. Her condition was diagnosed promptly once she was seen. The aneurysm was large, approximately 10 cm in size, and could easily be detected by touch by a physician during a physical exam. Even after Mrs. Utterback was determined to be suffering from an dissecting abdominal aortic aneurysm ("AAA"), Kaiser failed to take prompt action to carry out the emergency surgery she needed. Instead, a non-emergency ambulance was ordered to take Mrs. Utterback from Point Eden Clinic to the Kaiser Hospital in Hayward at the height of rush-hour traffic. Moments after arriving at the Kaiser Hospital emergency room in Hayward, Mrs. Utterback’s blood pressure "crashed", which indicated that her aneurysm had ruptured. By the time Mrs. Utterback was finally taken to emergency surgery minutes later, it was too late to perform surgery that would ultimately save her life. 11. The aneurysm burst at approximately 5:45 p.m. After surgery to attempt to repair the ruptured aneurysm, Mrs. Utterback was sent to CCU and never regained full consciousness before dying 36 hours later. 12. Mrs. Utterback’s medical records indicate that there was an abnormality in her abdominal aorta as much as 10 years earlier that was never followed up or investigated. B. Wolfgang Spunbarg 13. Wolfgang Spunbarg, a 72-year old Kaiser enrollee, was taken to the Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department by his wife, Edith Spunbarg, on April 25, 2000. Mr. Spunbarg told his wife that he was experiencing severe pain in his testicles and abdomen. 14. Upon arrival, Mr. Spunbarg walked into the emergency department while his wife parked the car. When Mrs. Spunbarg walked in the Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department, she saw her husband sitting in the waiting area with other people. According to medical records he checked in at 11:27 p.m. on April 25, 2000. However, he did not receive an initial exam until 11:45 p.m. 15. Mrs. Spunbarg told the receptionist in the emergency department that her husband had problems with his heart, was taking medication, and should be seen immediately. Mrs. Spunbarg was told by the receptionist that the emergency department was too busy and Mr. Spunbarg would have to wait. 16. Mr. Spunbarg remained in the waiting area of the emergency department for a minimum of eighteen minutes before he was seen by a health care professional. During that time he was in severe pain and was making a moaning sound audible to other people in the waiting area. 17. Dr. Mona Balogh was summoned by Mrs. Spunbarg while Dr. Balogh was talking to another patient. Dr. Balogh told a nurse to assist Mr. Spunbarg. When the nurse arrived she argued with Mrs. Spunbarg for a period of time before checking Mr. Spunbarg’s vital signs for the first time at 11:45 p.m. 18. Thereafter, at approximately 11:50 p.m., Mr. Spunbarg became unconscious and collapsed in the emergency department. Emergency protocols were used in an attempt to save Mr. Spunbarg’s life. However, he never regained consciousness and Mr. Spunbarg was pronounced dead at approximately 1:21 a.m. on April 26, 2000. Mr. Spunbarg’s cause of death was listed as Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm. C. James West 19. James West, a 62-year-old man, was diagnosed with a 6 cm abdominal aortic aneurysm on June 5, 1999. 20. Mr. West had a Kaiser primary care physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui, who referred him to Kaiser vascular surgeon Charles Reider for treatment of the AAA. 21. Mr. West met with Dr. Charles Reider on June 15, 1999 to discuss the AAA. 22. On June 21, 1999, while undergoing a catropil renal scan at Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital, Mr. West lost consciousness. 23. Mr. West was taken to the emergency department and admitted to Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital. 9 Second Amended Accusation 98-126, RGR 24. On June 22, 1999, James West was discharged from the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital without any further diagnostic testing of his AAA. 25. On June 23, 1999, Mr. West had an aortography and iliac angiogram as an outpatient at Kaiser Walnut Creek by Dr. Ho. 26. On June 25, 1999, Mr. West arrived at a scheduled appointment with his primary care physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui. Dr. Nauqui did not have James West’s medical chart and had no knowledge of Mr. West’s hospitalization on June 21 and June 22. 27. On June 25, 1999, Mr. West also had an appointment with Dr. Reider. Dr. Reider had no knowledge or information regarding James West’s hospitalization on June 21. 28. On June 27, 1999, Mrs. West took her husband, Mr. West, to the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital emergency room due to severe abdominal pain. 29. A CT scan was performed on Mr. West at the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital by Dr. Victoria Flavell. The test showed the aneurysm was now 6.8 cm. 30. On June 28, 1999, Mrs. West saw Dr. Charles Reider in a hallway of the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital. Dr. Reider was the on-call vascular surgeon for the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital on June 28, 1999. Dr. Reider told Mrs. West that he had not been informed that his patient, Mr. West, had been hospitalized on June 27, 1999. 31. Dr. Charles Reider told Mrs. West that he was currently on his way to perform surgery on another patient, but would check on Mr. West when he was finished. 32. While Dr. Charles Reider was in surgery with the other patient, Mr. West was found pulseless and unresponsive in his bed. The diagnosis was a ruptured AAA. 10 Second Amended Accusation 98-126, RGR 33. Mr. West was rushed to the operating room where Dr. Charles Reider performed an attempt at abdominal aortic aneurysm repair. 34. Mr. West never regained consciousness and died on June 29, 1999. 35. Dr. Syed Nauqui, Mr. West’s primary care physician, was not notified of James West’s hospitalization on June 27, 1999 until after he expired. FIRST CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE (RESPONDENT HAS VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO CARE) 36. Health and Safety Code section 1367(e)(1) states that "All services shall be readily available at reasonable times to all enrollees. To the extent feasible, the plan shall make all services readily accessible to all enrollees."4 37. Rule 1300.67.2 sets forth the standard for health plans to meet regarding access to care.5 4 Also, Health and Safety Code section 1367(f) requires a plan to employ and utilize allied health manpower for the furnishing of services to the extent permitted by law and consistent with good medical practice. 5 Rule 1300.67.2 states: Within each service area of a plan, basic health care services and specialized health care services shall be readily available and accessible to each of the plan's enrollees; (c) Emergency health care services shall be available and accessible within the service area twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week; (d) The ratio of enrollees to staff, including health professionals, administrative and other supporting staff, directly or through referrals, shall be such as to reasonably assure that all services offered by the plan will be accessible to enrollees on an appropriate basis without delays detrimental to the health of the enrollees. There shall be at least one full-time equivalent physician to each one thousand two hundred (1,200) enrollees and there shall be approximately one full-time equivalent primary care physician for each two thousand (2,000) enrollees, or an alternative mechanism shall be provided by the plan to demonstrate an adequate ratio of physicians to enrollees. Utterback 38. Kaiser failed and/or continues to fail to provide enrollees with access to care in the following respects (each act forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty): (a) The Kaiser telephone call center does not have a triage system for AAA thereby failing to ensure that all enrollees are receiving all services in a readily accessible manner; (b) Enrollees who telephone the call center are not allowed to be transferred to their physicians or to the physicians’ nurses, thereby not providing services to all enrollees in a readily accessible manner; (c) Every time an enrollee telephones, the Kaiser call
system is such that the enrollee reaches a different medical assistant enrollee with services, such as appointments and access to advice nurses thereby failing to assure that all enrollees are receiving all services in a readily accessible manner; (d) The Kaiser appointment system does not have the means to prioritize same day appointments thereby failing to ensure that all enrollees are receiving all services in a readily accessible manner; (e) There are no guidelines for how e-mail messages are prioritized or processed once they have been sent to the clinic; (f) When an enrollee arrives at a clinic earlier and announces to the receptionist and/or M.A. that he/she is in pain and would like to be put in a room, lay down and/or be seen earlier, there is no Kaiser system in place to ensure that the enrollee is triaged by an R.N. and/or a physician thereby failing to ensure that all enrollees are receiving all services in a readily accessible manner; (g) No medical professional spoke to and/or had any contact with Mrs. Utterback for approximately eight hours after her first attempt to get assistance thereby failing to ensure that all services to Mrs. Utterback were available in a readily accessible manner; (h) Mrs. Utterback’s complaints and desires were communicated only to M.A.s who are not medically trained to perform medical triage on a patient thereby failing to ensure that all services provided to Mrs. Utterback were available in a readily accessible manner; and, (i) Kaiser failed to maintain the appropriate enrollee to staff ratios at Medical Station 6 on or about January 26, 1996. Spunbarg 39. In the case of Mr. Spunbarg, Kaiser failed, and continues to fail, to provide available and accessible emergency health care services at the Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department (each act forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty): (a) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department was closed due to saturation6 when Mr. Spunbarg arrived for services; (b) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department closes due to saturation on an average of two days per week; (c) Enrollees who arrive at the Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department are not advised by Kaiser when the emergency department is closed due to saturation; and, (d) Kaiser Woodland Hills utilizes a receptionist, untrained in health care, to make an initial assessment of a newl y arriving enrollee that otherwise should be seen by a health care professional. SECOND CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE (RESPONDENT HAS VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO PROVIDE CONTINUITY OF CARE) 40. Health and Safety Code section 1367(d) requires that the plan furnish services in a manner providing continuity of care and ready referral of patients to other providers at times as may be appropriate consistent with good professional practice. 41. Rule 1300.67.1 sets forth the standard for health plans to meet with respect to continuity of care.7 6 A term meaning all beds are full and no ambulance transport patients will be accepted. 7 Rule 1300.67.1 states: Within each service area of a plan, basic health care services shall be provided in a manner which provides continuity of care, including but not limited to: (a) The availability of primary care physicians, who will be responsible for coordinating the provision of health care services to each enrollee; (c) The maintenance and ready availability of medical records, with sharing within the plan of all pertinent information relating to the health care of each enrollee; (d) The maintenance of staff, including health professionals, administrative and other supporting staff, directly or through an adequate referral system, sufficient to assure that health care services will be provided on a timely and appropriate basis to enrollees. 14 Second Amended Accusation 98-126, RGR Utterback 42. Kaiser failed and/or continues to fail to provide enrollees with continuity of care in the following respects (each act forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty): (a) The Kaiser call center does not have a triage system for AAA thereby failing to ensure that all enrollees are receiving all services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers which are appropriate and consistent with good professional practice; (b) No one, based on Mrs. Utterback’s symptoms, advised her to go to the emergency room thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser furnished services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers which would have been appropriate and consistent with good professional practice; (c) Expecting M.A.s (as opposed to R.N.s or physicians) to ask enrollees appropriate questions in order to send medically sound e-mail messages to physicians fails to ensure that Kaiser furnishes services in a manner providing continuity of care; (d) No medical professional spoke to and/or had any contact with Mrs. Utterback for approximately eight hours after her first attempt to get assistance thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser furnished services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers which would have been appropriate and consistent with good professional practice; (e) There is no documentation that Mrs. Utterback was offered an appointment with another physician. Even if she had been, it would have been in violation of Kaiser’s own Appointment Guidelines, thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser furnished services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers which would have been appropriate and consistent with good professional practice; and, (f) On January 26, 1996, Mrs. Utterback’s complaints and desires were communicated only to M.A.s who are not medically trained to perform medical triage on a patient thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser furnished services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers, such as those available in the emergency department, which would have been appropriate and consistent with good professional practice. 43. Kaiser fails to maintain and have medical records readily available, with sharing within the Kaiser system of all pertinent information relating to the health care of each enrollee in at least the following four ways: (a) The advice nurses have no medical charts available to them at the Call Center so that adequate information cannot either be evaluated by the R.N. or communicated to the physician; (b) When physicians receive e-mail messages from the Call Center or the enrollee is able to secure a same day appointment, the medical chart is not available on the premises for the physician to review prior to rendering medical care or a medical opinion to the enrollee; and (c) The e-mail that described Mrs. Utterback’s symptoms, which indicated that a prescription for a narcotic was prescribed when Mrs. Utterback was specifically seeking access to care by way of an appointment, is omitted from the medical chart. 44. Kaiser failed to monitor the follow up of Mrs. Utterback’s health care documentation. (a) When Mrs. Utterback’s medical records revealed abnormalities in her chest x-rays, her primary care physicians failed to follow up on the radiologists’ comments thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser furnished services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers which would have been appropriate and consistent with good professional practice. Expecting M.A.s (as opposed to R.N.s or physicians) to ask enrollees appropriate questions in order to send medically sound e-mail messages to physicians fails to ensure that Kaiser furnishes services in a manner providing continuity of care.
Spunbarg 45. Rule 1300.67.1(d) provides that within each service area of a plan, basic health care services8 shall be provided in a manner which provides continuity of care, including but not limited to the following subdivision: "(d) The maintenance of staff, including health professionals, administrative and other supporting staff, directly or through an adequate referral system, sufficient to assure that health care services will be provided on a timely and appropriate basis to enrollees." 46. Kaiser failed to maintain sufficient health care professional staff to assure that health care services were being provided on a timely and appropriate basis and consistent with good professional practice to Mr. Spunbarg (each act forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty): (a) Kaiser health care professionals failed to assess the condition of Mr. Spunbarg for 18 minutes after he arrived at the emergency department because of insufficient staffing at the Kaiser Woodland Hills facility; (b) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department was closed due to saturation at the time Mr. Spunbarg arrived; (c) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department closes due to saturation two days per week on average; and, 8 "Basic Health Care Services" is defined in Health and Safety Code section 1345(b) and includes emergency health care services in 1345(b)(6). (d) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department requires a receptionist to triage patients when they first arrive. West 47. Rule 1300.67.1(c) and (e) provides for, (c) The maintenance and ready availability of medical records, with sharing within the plan of all pertinent information relating to the health care of each enrollee; (e) An adequate system of documentation of referrals to physicians or other health professionals. The monitoring of the follow up on enrollees’ health care documentation shall be the responsibility of the health care service plan and associated health professionals. 48. Kaiser failed to maintain and have readily available medical records, with sharing within the plan of all pertinent information relating to the health care of Mr. West. (a) Kaiser failed to share information of Mr. West’s hospitalization on June 21 and June 22, 1999 with his primary care physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui. (b) Kaiser failed to share information of Mr. West’s hospitalization on June 21 and June 22, 1999 with his vascular surgeon, Dr. Charles Reider. (c) Kaiser failed to make Mr. West’s medical records available for his appointment on June 25, 1999 with his primary care physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui. (d) Kaiser failed to share information on James West’s hospitalization on June 27, 1999 with his primary care physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui. (e) Kaiser failed to share information of Mr. West’s hospitalization on June 27, 1999 with his vascular surgeon, Dr. Charles Reider. 49. Kaiser fails to have an adequate system in place for the maintenance and ready availability of medical records with sharing within the plan of all pertinent information relating to the health care of each enrollee. (a) Kaiser fails to have a system in place in which pertinent information of enrollees with "high risk" medical condition can be shared within the plan on a timely basis. THIRD CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE (RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY CARE SERVICES) 50. Health and Safety Code section 1367(i) states as follows, "Each health care service plan contract shall provide to subscribers and enrollees all of the basic health care services included in subdivision (b) of Section 1345…." 51. Rule 1300.67 states: Scope of Basic Health Care Services The basic health care services required to be provided by a health care service plan to its enrollees shall include, where medically necessary…: (g) Emergency health care services which shall be available and accessible to enrollees on a twenty-four hour a day, seven days a week, basis within the health care service plan area. Emergency health care services shall include ambulance services for the area served by the plan to transport the enrollee to the nearest twenty-four hour emergencyfacility with physician coverage, designated by the Health Care Service Plan. 52. Kaiser failed and/or continues to fail to provide enrollees with emergency care in the following respects (each act forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty): (a) No protocols or guidelines exist for Kaiser Hayward clinics with regard to when 911 should be activated as opposed to an in-house call to a "hub" to contact "emergency" transport. The lack of guidelines fails to ensure that services are available and accessible to enrollees twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, within the health care service plan area; (b) Not having protocols in place from 1996 through the present, regarding the use of the most emergent transportation available to transport patients when needed to the Hayward Emergency Department, fails to ensure that services are available and accessible to enrollees twenty-hour hours a day, seven days a week, within the health care service plan area; and, (c) In the case of Mrs. Utterback, who was suffering from a dissecting AAA, Kaiser failed to provide emergency health care services, including the appropriate ambulance services for the area served by the plan, to transport her to the nearest twenty-four hour emergency facility with physician coverage in a timely manner. This failure to utilize the proper emergency transport failed to ensure that all health care services were available to Mrs. Utterback in a readily accessible manner as required by the Act. FOURTH CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE (RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROMPTLY AND REASONABLY RESOLVE THE FAMILY’S GRIEVANCE) 53. Health and Safety Code section 1368.01 (for years 1996-1999)9 stated: (a) The grievance system shall require the plan to resolve grievances within 30 days whenever possible and shall require the plan to provide enrollees and subscribers with a written statement on the disposition or pending status of the grievance within 30 days of the plan’s receipt of the grievance. 54. Rule 1300.68. Grievance System A plan grievance system established pursuant to the requirement of Section 1368 of the Act shall include at least the following features: (a) The system shall be established, pursuant to written procedures, for the receipt, handling and disposition of complaints. An officer of the plan shall be designated as having primary responsibility for the maintenance of such procedures and for the review of their operations and for the utilization of any emergent patterns of grievances in the formulation of policy changes and procedural improvements in the plan's administration. 9 The current version of Health and Safety Code section 1368.01(a) is as follows: 22 Second Amended Accusation 98-126, RGR (e) Complaint forms and a copy of the grievance procedure shall be readily available at each facility of the plan and the plan shall provide them to subscribers and enrollees promptly upon receipt of a request. (g) A grievance system shall provide (1) for the acknowledgment of the receipt of a complaint and notice to the complainant of who may be contacted with respect to the complaint within 20 days, and (2) for notice and a written statement to the complainant of the disposition or pending status of the complaint within 30 days of the plan's receipt of the complaint. Where the plan is unable to distinguish between complaints and inquiries, they shall be considered complaints. (h) A grievance system shall provide for a prompt review of complaints by the management or supervisory staff responsible for the services or operations which are the subject of the complaint. 55. Kaiser failed to provide Mrs. Utterback with an adequate grievance system in the following manner (each act forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty): (a) The grievance system shall require the plan to resolve grievances within 30 days. 23 Second Amended Accusation 98-126, RGR (a) The complaint was not resolved in 30 days. In fact, to this date, the complaint continues to be unresolved; (b) The Kaiser grievance system was not established, pursuant to written procedures, for the receipt, handling and disposition of complaints. In 1996, there was no officer of Kaiser that was designated as having primary responsibility for the maintenance of such procedures and for the review of their operations and for the utilization of any emergent patterns of grievances in the formulation of policy changes and procedural improvements in Kaiser’s administration; (c) Complaint forms and a copy of a grievance procedure were not made available to the Utterback family. Instead, the Utterback family had to create their own letter explaining its complaint; (d) In the Utterback situation, the grievance system failed to provide (1) the acknowledgment of the receipt of a complaint and notice to the family of whom may be contacted with respect to the complaint within 20 days, and failed to (2) give notice and a written statement to the Utterback family of the disposition or pending status of the complaint within 30 days of Kaiser's receipt of the grievance; and, (e) Kaiser’s grievance system failed to provide for a prompt review of the Utterback family’s complaints by the management or supervisory staff responsible for the services or operations which are the subject of the complaint. 24 Second Amended Accusation 98-126, RGR PRAYER WHEREFORE, complainant prays that a hearing be held on the matters alleged herein and that following the hearing a decision be rendered by the Director of the Department of Managed Health Care assessing an administrative penalty against Kaiser Foundation Health Care, Inc. of ($1,100,000.00) One Million One Hundred Thousand dollars and ordering such other and further relief as the Director deems proper. Dated: February 9, 2001 ______________________________________ Rebecca G. Ruggero Senior Counsel Attorney for Department of Managed Health Care
December 27, 2000 Ellen Leonard, Senior Counsel Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. One Kaiser Plaza Oakland, CA 94612 RE: Assessment of Administrative Penalty Against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. Dear Ms. Leonard: The Department of Managed Health Care (the "Department") has concluded an investigation in the matter of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. ("KFHP") and the inadvertent release of KFHP member’s confidential medical information by KP Online in August 2000. Kaiser Permanente Online is a website through which KFHP members can access health information, participate in discussion groups, make appointments and request advice from a nurse or ask questions of a pharmacist. On August 2, 2000, as a result of an error in a program created to send previously undelivered e-mail, e-mail messages intended for over 450 California KFHP members were mistakenly sent through the Kaiser Permanente Online service to the e-mail addresses of 17 other KFHP members. KFHP promptly reported the problem to the Department and contacted all of the involved members. The 17 members who were sent the e-mail messages reported that either they never received the messages or that they had deleted them. The Department’s investigation has found that the error was inadvertent, that KFHP acted promptly to mitigate any harm, and has implemented corrective measures to reduce the likelihood of such an event happening again. Nevertheless, the Department has concluded that a violation of the Knox-Keene Act did occur. Therefore, the Department finds that KFHP has violated Health and Safety Code Section 1386 (b)(15) and imposes an Administrative Penalty in the amount of State of California Gray Davis, Governor Business, Transportation and Housing Agency 980 Ninth Street Suite 500 Sacramento, CA 95814 916-324-3669 jnovello @ dmhc.ca.gov e-mail Ellen Leonard Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. December 22, 2000 Page 2 $25,000.00. The amount of the fine is less than that which the Department would have otherwise sought had KFHP not been forthcoming about the incident, and had it not taken steps to remedy the problems resulting from the error. It is the Department’s understanding that KFHP has concluded that it is in their best interest, and the interest of its members, to resolve the matter at this time by paying the fine. Thank you for cooperation and speedy resolution of this matter. Sincerely, James Novello Staff Counsel Department of Managed Health Care
WILLIAM KENEFICK (#59588) Acting Commissioner of Corporations G. LEWIS CHARTRAND, JR. (#124389) Supervising Corporations Counsel REBECCA G. RUGGERO (#165581) Corporations Counsel JOAN W. CAVANAGH (#56708) Senior Corporations Counsel CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS 980 9th Street, Suite 500 Sacramento, CA 95814-2725 Telephone: (916) 323-0435 Facsimile: (916) 323-0438 Attorneys for Complainant BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In the Matter of the Accusation and Notice of Intent to Assess Administrative Penalties Against KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. (UTTERBACK). Respondent FILE NO: 933-0055 OAH NO: ACCUSATION AND PETITION TO ASSESS ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AGAINST THE LICENSEE PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE DATE: TIME: DEPT: HEARING DATE: TIME: DEPT: -i- Accusation 98-126, RGR TABLE OF CONTENTS In The Matter of the Accusation and Notice of Intent to Access Administrative Penalties Against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Utterback) I. Introduction ................................................1 II. Jurisdiction ................................................2 III. Statement Of Facts ..........................................3 A. Margaret Utterback ......................................3 B. Abdominal Aortic Aneurysms...............................4 C. The Morning Of January 26, 1996 And Mrs. Utterback’s Calls To Kaiser .........................................5 D. The First Long Wait .....................................8 E. Mrs. Utterback’s Contact With Medical Professionals Prior To Arriving At The Clinic And The Failure To Follow Appointment Guidelines...........................10 F. The Long Wait At the Kaiser Clinic ......................10 G. The Rapid Diagnosis ....................................11 H. The Effect Of Kaiser’s Failure To Instigate Standard AAA Protocols ..........................................13 I. The Rupture And The Emergency Surgery ...................14 J. Mrs. Utterback’s Last Hours Of Life .....................14 K. The Family’s Futile Attempts To Get Answers From Kaiser Through Its Grievance Process ....................15 IV. Kaiser’s Violations Of The Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act And The California Code Of Regulations .............20 A. Kaiser’s Phone System, E-Mail System, Appointment Guidelines, Understaffing And Lack Of Documentation Created Barriers To Access To Care .....................20 i. Controlling Authority.............................20 a. Access To Care................................20 b. Continuity Of Care ............................21 -ii- Accusation 98-126, RGR ii. Kaiser’s Phone And E-Mail System .................21 iii. Kaiser’s Appointment System .......................23 iv. Kaiser’s Understaffing ............................24 v. Kaiser’s Inadequate Documentation .................25 B. Kaiser Failed to Provide Basic Health Care Services Mandated by Knox-Keene.................................25 i. Controlling Authority For Preventive Care .........25 ii. Kaiser’s System For Providing Preventive Care......27 iii. Controlling Authority For Emergency Care ..........28 iv. Kaiser’s System For Emergency Care ................30 C. Kaiser Failed To Demonstrate That It Has Organizational And Administrative Capacity To Provide Services To Enrollees, Including The Maintenance Of Medical Records .........................31 D. Kaiser Failed To Promptly And Reasonably Resolve The Family’s Grievance ....................................33 V. Disregard For The Requirements Of The Act Make It Necessary To Assess Administrative Penalties ................37 -iii- Accusation 98-126, RGR TABLE OF AUTHORITIES In The Matter of the Accusation and Notice of Intent to Access Administrative Penalties Against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Utterback) Statutes Health & Safety Code section 1345(b)(5)....................3, 25, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1345(b)(6)....................3, 28, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1367(e)(1)....................3, 20, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1367(d).......................3, 21, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1367(f).......................3, 20, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1367(g).......................3, 31, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1367(i).......................3, 25, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1367.69(b)....................3, 25, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1368.01(a)....................3, 33, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1368.04(b)................3, 33, 34, 38 Health & Safety Code section 1386.........................37, 38, 39 Regulations CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67 .......................................... 26, 29 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67(f) ........................................ 3, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67(g) ............................................ 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.1 ........................................ 21, 31 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.1(a) ...................................... 3, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.1(c) ...................................... 3, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.1(d) ...................................... 3, 38 -iv- Accusation 98-126, RGR CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.1(e) .......................................... 3 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.2 ........................................ 20, 29 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.2(a) ...................................... 3, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.2(b) ...................................... 3, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.2(c) ...................................... 3, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.67.2(d) ...................................... 3, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.68 ........................................3, 34, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.70(b)(2)(G) ..................................... 27 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.70(b)(2)(G)(5) ............................... 3, 38 CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3 section 1300.70(b)(2)(G)(6) ............................... 3, 38 -1- Accusation 98-126, RGR The complainant, Commissioner of Corporations of the State of California (the "Commissioner"), charges Respondent Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., ("Kaiser") as follows: I. INTRODUCTION 1. This accusation seeks the imposition of a fine against Kaiser as an administrative penalty for systemic barriers to healthcare services that caused the preventable death of one of its enrollees, Margaret Utterback, on January 28, 1996. 2. On January 26, 1996, Mrs. Utterback was experiencing severe pain relating to an abdominal aortic aneurysm. She was exhibiting classic symptoms of the life-threatening condition, and her medical history made her a likely candidate for this condition. Even so, it took Mrs. Utterback eight hours of continual efforts to obtain an appointment with her physician. Within an hour of seeing her physician her aneurysm burst. By that time, surgery was too late. Despite transfusions of 24 pints of blood, Mrs. Utterback died in the Kaiser Hayward Hospital Critical Care Unit ("CCU") a day and a half later. 3. While Mrs. Utterback’s efforts to see her doctor on January 26 were being hindered, other patients with relatively minor complaints, such as "arm pain" and "right finger pain", were calling into Kaiser and received appointments to be seen by her doctor. 4. Mrs. Utterback had been a Kaiser patient for fifty years prior to her death. Her death is rendered more tragic by the fact that an abnormality in the area of her abdominal aorta is discernible in a Kaiser x-ray taken in 1986. During the subsequent ten years, two different primary care physicians failed to provide preventive care that could have saved her life, and avoided her need for emergency services on January 26 that turned out not to be available. 5. This accusation is based upon Kaiser’s failure to provide Mrs. Utterback basic health care services, including both preventive and emergency care, its failure to make health care services reasonably accessible to her, and its failure to resolve her family’s subsequent grievance in a prompt and reasonable manner. II. JURISDICTION 6. At all times since November 4, 1977, Kaiser has been, and now is, a full service health care plan and the holder of a license (File No. 933 0055) issued by the Commissioner pursuant to the Knox- Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, Health and Safety Code section 1340 et seq. ("Knox-Keene Act"). Its principal corporate office is located at 1800 Harrison Street, 8th Floor, Oakland, California 94612. 7. The Commissioner is vested with responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the Knox-Keene Act pursuant to Health and Safety Code ("H & S") section 1341 et seq. During an investigation into this matter, the Department of Corporations (the "Department") found evidence that Kaiser violated several Knox-Keene provisions as follows: a. Kaiser failed to ensure that subscribers and enrollees would receive available and accessible health and medical services rendered in a manner providing continuity of care (H & S section 1367(d), 1367(e)(1) and 1367(f) and California Code of Regulations, Title 10 ("10 CCR"), Chapter 3, section 1300.67.1(a), (c) and (d) and section 1300.67.2(a), (b), (c) and (d)); b. Kaiser failed to provide basic health care services including providing preventive care and emergency services(H & S section 1345(b)(5) and (6), 1367(i), 1367.69(b), 10 CCR sections 1300.67(f), 1300.70(b)(2)(G)(5) and(6)); c. Kaiser failed to demonstrate that the plan had the organizational and administrative capacity to provide services to enrollees (H & S section 1367(g)), which includes the maintenance and ready availability of medical records (10 CCR 1300.67.1(c)); and d. Kaiser failed to act promptly and reasonably with regard to its grievance procedure (H & S Code section 1368.01(a), 1368.04(b), 10 CCR 1300.68). III. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. MARGARET UTTERBACK 8. In January 1996, Margaret Utterback, 74 years old, and a Kaiser patient for 50 years, was still living in her home. She took reasonably good care of herself and was in generally good health up to the day she went to Kaiser with back pain that radiated to the right side of her abdomen. 9. Her medical problems were few. She had suffered from hypertension for more than 30 years. She also suffered from minor ailments such as arthritis in her feet and skin lumps on her arms which her physician believed was sarcoidosis, a connective skin disorder. However, she was diligent in getting medical care when needed and carrying out follow-up visits. 10. Kaiser medical records indicate that Mrs. Utterback had been a smoker since the 1940’s and was diagnosed at Kaiser for atherosclerosis. She quit smoking approximately 2 years before her death in January 1996. 11. Mrs. Utterback had a family history of high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis. During all relevant times, medical records indicate that Kaiser was aware of this family medical history. B. ABDOMINAL AORTIC ANEURYSMS 12. An abdominal aortic aneurysm ("AAA") develops when weakness in the wall of the aortic artery causes the vessel to swell. Rupture or threatened rupture of an abdominal aneurysm is a surgical emergency. If the vessel bursts, the patient can bleed to death in a short period of time. 13. The condition normally takes many years to develop. Typically, a developing aortic aneurysm will increase its diameter at a rate of approximately 0.5 c.m. per year. 14. Most cases of AAA are caused by arteriosclerosis. the formation of aortic aneurysms. Hypertension is one of the most common conditions which increases the stress of the aortic wall. 15. For a patient who is asymptomatic, the diagnosis may first be suspected by an x-ray of the chest or abdomen, which will demonstrate a curvilinear calcification in the wall of the aneurysm. The diagnosis is confirmed by an ultrasound. 16. Generally, a symptomatic patient with AAA is an older person who complains of abdominal pain and back pain. AAA’s impinge on the lumbar vertebrae which is often responsible for lower back pain. 17. Surgery prolongs life by preventing rupture of the aneurysm. Symptomatic or expanding aneurysms should have prompt surgical correction. 18. Some patients with ruptured aneurysms survive long enough to become candidates for emergency surgical repair. These patients will usually present in shock and have severe pain in their abdomen, lower back, or both. A tender pulsatile mass may be palpated. The survival rate with emergency surgery in these circumstances is about 50 percent. C. THE MORNING OF JANUARY 26, 1996 AND MRS. UTTERBACK’S CALLS TO KAISER 19. On January 26, 1996, Mrs. Utterback woke up with pain in her back which radiated toward her abdomen on the right side. She had been experiencing back pain since the day before and thought the pain was due to stiffness from previously sitting in a hard chair. The pain progressed that morning. She also experienced abdominal pain that she attributed to shellfish she had eaten the previous night. 20. At approximately 8:15 a.m., Mrs. Utterback called her daughter, Barbara Winnie, and asked her to come over because she had experienced a sharp pain while coming out of her bathroom that morning. 21. When Mrs. Winnie arrived at approximately 9:30 a.m., she found her mother in bed, still in her pajamas. Although uncomfortable, Mrs. Utterback was not feeling the sharp pain that she had experienced earlier. 22. She reported to her daughter that she had tried reaching her primary care physician at Kaiser, Rod Perry, M.D., when the clinic opened at 8:30 a.m., and was on hold for so long that she decided to hang up. The phone number that Mrs. Utterback used to secure an appointment came from her address book under "Rod Perry."1 23. Between 9:45 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Mrs. Utterback tried to call Kaiser again. Mrs. Winnie overheard this conversation and was also informed of the details of the conversation afterwards. Mrs. Winnie essentially recalls this call as follows: 24. Mrs. Utterback explained her symptoms, that she was having pain on the right side of her back that was radiating to her abdomen, and asked if she could get an appointment to see her doctor. She was 1 The phone number for Dr. Perry previously was for his clinic directly, but later was "rolled-over" to the Hayward phone center that consisted of 5 to 6 different rooms of medical assistants ("M.A.’s") and/or registered nurses ("R.N.’s") at another Kaiser location. In other words, even though Mrs. Utterback used the phone number that had once been assigned to Dr. Perry, her call could be answered by any number of M.A.’s in a completely different building. In fact, the phone number could no longer connect Mrs. Utterback with Dr. Perry at Medical Station 6 in Point Eden Clinic. All calls went to one of many phone rooms in the Kaiser Hayward Hospital that was approximately 2 miles from Dr. Perry at Point Eden Clinic, most of which were operated and occupied by medical assistants. told by the person who answered the phone that there were no appointments available. Mrs. Utterback explained her symptoms again and asked if she could be put through to her doctor or the clinic so she could talk to someone there, but the person on the other end of the phone said that she could not do that. After that, the person said something to the effect that, "If you think that you need to be seen, call back at 3:00 p.m. and get an urgent care appointment for that evening." Mrs. Utterback was told that the urgent care clinic was the procedure to be used when there were no same day appointments available with her doctor. 25. After hanging up, Mrs. Utterback and Mrs. Winnie discussed the conversation and Mrs. Utterback decided to call back. Mrs. Utterback described her symptoms again to the new person who answered the phone, i.e., right side back pain that was radiating to her abdomen. After being transferred a couple of times, she finally was put in contact with someone whom Mrs. Utterback thought was kind and willing to listen. This particular woman offered to send an e-mail message to Mrs. Utterback’s physician, Dr. Perry, about her wanting to be seen that day. Mrs. Utterback understood that once the e-mail was sent, she was to wait for her doctor to get back to her. Mrs. Winnie recalls that this conversation occurred at approximately 10:15 a.m. which is consistent with the time that the e-mail2 was actually 2 The actual e-mail message that was sent by a medical assistant is considered an official medical record which Kaiser has consistently failed to produce. E-mail messages are usually sent to the patient’s physician for him or her to decide what to do. The medical assistant sends the message from whatever phone room she is in, and it prints out at the physician station in hard copy on pink paper. Once the disposition is written on the hard copy of the e-mail message, this document is filed in the medical chart as an official medical record. E-mail messages are kept on the computer system for two weeks (and backed-up for 90 days). Even though the Utterback family members came to Kaiser to complain about the needless death of their mother before the two week period expired, no one seems to be able to find sent at 10:18 a.m. 26. Mrs. Utterback was not given an appointment during this conversation. D. THE FIRST LONG WAIT 27. While waiting to hear back from Dr. Perry’s office, Mrs. Utterback reclined almost the whole time, but did get up at around 12:00 noon to have some soup that her daughter prepared for her. After not hearing back for nearly two hours, the two of them agreed that they would surely hear from Dr. Perry either during lunch or right after the lunch hour. However, when 1:45 p.m. arrived, Mrs. Utterback and her daughter agreed that "Enough is enough" and tried to call back to find out what, if anything, Dr. Perry had decided to do. 28. Mrs. Utterback called and explained to the person who answered the phone this time the steps she had taken up to this point in order to be seen by Dr. Perry. She again explained that she had right back pain radiating to her abdomen, which was getting more painful. She reiterated her efforts to see Dr. Perry and her symptoms as she was transferred several times. She also explained that she was frustrated, wanted a same day appointment and had been waiting to hear from Dr. Perry since 10:00 a.m. that morning. the message nor does it appear that an extra copy was printed within that two week period. Mally Monton, M.A., the person who sent the message at 10:18 a.m. on January 26, 1996 had the opportunity to copy the message, verbatim, while she was questioned about the contents of it less than two weeks after the incident. This is the only copy of the message the Department has been able to obtain. The copy from which Ms. Monton wrote down the contents of the message was inexplicably thrown away in the trash moments later by her supervising nurse. 29. After speaking to several different people, it appeared to Mrs. Winnie that her mother had finally reached someone sympathetic based on the tone of Mrs. Utterback’s voice. Apparently, this person offered to transfer Mrs. Utterback to "Patient Assistance." However, when that transfer occurred, Mrs. Utterback reached a voice mail recording so decided to hang up. 30. Mrs. Utterback immediately called back the phone bank one more time, and after explaining her symptoms and all her futile attempts to get assistance again, she finally, after several attempts, reached a person who was able to get her scheduled for an appointment at 4:15 p.m.3 However, Mrs. Utterback had to insist on being seen that day because the medical assistant, at first, told Mrs. Utterback that Dr. Perry declined giving her an appointment that day, but opted to write her a prescription for narcotic pain medicine instead4. Finally, upon Mrs. Utterback's insistence, the medical assistant agreed to give her an appointment late in the day. 3 At all times, according to Kaiser’s own records, Mrs. Utterback never was connected to a registered nurse nor instructed to go to the emergency room. There is no evidence that Mrs. Utterback was offered an appointment with another physician. In fact, it was in violation of Kaiser’s own appointment guidelines to have offered Mrs. Utterback an appointment with another physician. Most important, however, is that it is not unreasonable for a patient to want to see her own doctor. This value is reflected in the Knox-Keene Act where it assures that subscribers and enrollees receive available and accessible health and medical services rendered in a manner providing continuity of care (H & S section 1367(d) and 10 CCR section 1300.67.1(a) (c), (d), and (e)). Seeing one’s own physician who is familiar with one’s medical history is not to be minimized. For example, in Mrs. Utterback’s case, a physician who is aware of her history of high blood pressure, her smoking habits, her family history of deaths related to arteriosclerosis and her own history of atherosclerosis, coupled with Mrs. Utterback’s clear descriptions of symptoms that day, could have been armed with the information necessary to recognize that AAA was certainly a strong possibility. 4 The prescription was written either for Tylenol with codeine or Vicodin. The actual prescription is also missing. 31. Mrs. Utterback and her daughter decided to go immediately to the clinic in order to try to get in to see Dr. Perry sooner if possible. This is corroborated by Kaiser employee Kali Bell, the medical assistant who booked the appointment at Dr. Perry’s station, who recalls that the daughter told her that they were leaving right away to try to get worked in sooner that day. E. MRS. UTTERBACK’S CONTACT WITH MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT THE CLINIC AND THE FAILURE TO FOLLOW APPOINTMENT GUIDELINES 32. Until arriving at the clinic, Mrs. Utterback never spoke to a registered nurse and/or "advice" nurse5 nor was she instructed to go to the emergency room by any Kaiser personnel. 33. Dr. Perry was the only licensed medical professional who knew of and/or otherwise had access to Mrs. Utterback’s medical history, knew of Mrs. Utterback’s symptoms stated in the e-mail message and her desire to be seen that day, yet his response was toprescribe Mrs. Utterback a narcotic pain medication. F. THE LONG WAIT AT THE KAISER CLINIC 34. Mrs. Utterback left after 2:00 p.m. and checked in no later than 2:45 p.m.6 at the Kaiser Point Eden clinic. Despite requesting three separate times to be seen sooner because her pain was worsening, staff at Kaiser refused. While waiting, Mrs. Utterback’s 5 Advice nurses are registered nurses ("R.N.s"). 6 Kaiser records indicate that Mrs. Utterback checked in at 3:32 p.m. The actual check-in time is still in dispute. pain increased to the point where her discomfort was visually observable. She squirmed in her chair and held onto her side. At all times, Mrs. Utterback was in plain view of the reception desk and the open hallway where the medical assistants would come out to call patients into the back. Not until 4:30 p.m. did Dr. Perry examine her, 15 minutes after her appointment time. 35. At one point, the medical assistant who was "rooming7" for Dr. Perry’s patients that day, Fatima Mehrzad, was informed of Mrs. Utterback’s desire to be put in a room. Two Kaiser receptionists testified that Ms. Mehrzad came out to the front, glanced through Mrs. Utterback’s chart8, looked out into the waiting room where she was sitting and stated, "She doesn’t look that sick to me" tossed the chart back and walked away. G. THE RAPID DIAGNOSIS 36. Once examined by Dr. Perry, he immediately diagnosed Mrs. Utterback with a dissecting9 abdominal aortic aneurysm ("AAA"). The x-ray report at the time of rupture indicated that the aneurysm was at least 10 c.m. in diameter. 37. A dissecting AAA is a life-threatening condition that requires complete adherence to a stringent set of protocols in order to save the patient’s life. Pre-hospital treatment consists of relief of pain (morphine sulfate is recommended if diagnosis is 7 "Rooming" means placing patients into a physician’s assigned exam room. 8 The "chart" is what the clinic puts together in the absence of being able to btain the actual medical chart from the chart room which requires several hours otice. The information available to the rooming medical assistant is the atient’s name, age, address, Kaiser medical number, reason for being seen and the ppointment time. 9 Dissecting AAA means that the aorta was already splitting apart. strongly suspected), immediate transport to hospital, decreasing the nxiety of the patient, gentle handling of p |