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Enforcement Action Against Kaiser Permanente

Enforcement

1 Second Amended Accusation

98-126, RGR

JOAN W. CAVANAGH (#56708)

Assistant Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement

REBECCA G. RUGGERO (#165581)

Senior Counsel

JAMES NOVELLO (#172964)

Staff Counsel

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE

980 9th Street, Suite 500

Sacramento, CA 95814-2725

Telephone: (916) 323-0435

Facsimile: (916) 323-0438

Attorneys for Complainant

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE

VS

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. (UTTERBACK)

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. (SPUNBARG)

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. (WEST)

FILE NO: 98-126, 00-190

OAH NO: N2000070472

SECOND AMENDED ACCUSATION AND PETITION TO ASSESS

ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AGAINST THE LICENSEE

HEARING DATE: January 8, 2001

HEARING TIME: 9:00 am

HEARING PLACE: 1515 Clay Street,

Room 206, Oakland, California 94612

INTRODUCTION

This case is brought pursuant to the provisions of the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Ac t of 1975, as amended 

(the "Act")1 based on the failure by Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. ("Kaiser"), the largest health care service plan in 

California, to provide three (now deceased) Kaiser enrollees, Margaret Utterback, Wolfgang Spunbarg, and James West 

with care and services as mandated by the Act.

1 The Act includes Health and Safety Code section 1340, et seq.

Kaiser failed to provide Margaret Utterback with access to care, continuity of care consistent with good professional 

service, and basic health care services such as emergency care. Kaiser also failed, and continues to fail, to demonstrate 

that it has the organizational and administrative capacity to provide services to enrollees by maintaining, filing and 

maintaining medical records such as e-mail messages. Finally, Kaiser failed to promptly and reasonably resolve the 

family’s grievance. Specifically, Kaiser failed to coordinate Mrs. Utterback’s care after an x-ray indicated that follow up 

was necessary; failed, and continues to fail, to have a system in place for a medical professional to triage abdominal aortic

aneurysm2 complaints; failed, and continues to fail, to have an appointment system that prioritizes appointments with 

physicians; failed to heed Mrs. Utterback’s repeated requests to see her physician once she arrived at a Kaiser clinic 

sooner than her scheduled appointment; and failed, and continues to fail, to have protocols in place regarding the use of 

emergency transport from a clinic to the emergency room to ensure patients are transferred timely and in accordance with 

their medical needs.

Regarding Wolfgang Spunbarg, Kaiser failed to provide him with accessible health care services and continuity of care 

consistent with good professional service.

Specifically, Kaiser failed to provide Mr. Spunbarg with timely and accessible emergency health care services for 

treatment of his abdominal aortic aneurysm.

2 An abdominal aortic aneurysm develops when weakness in the wall of the aortic artery causes the vessel to swell. Rupture or threatened rupture of an abdominal aneurysm is a surgical emergency. If the vessel bursts, the patient can bleed to death in a short period of time. The condition normally takes many years to develop.

3 Second Amended Accusation

98-126, RGR

Regarding James West, Kaiser failed to provide him with continuity of care consistent with good professional service. 

Specifically Kaiser failed to share all pertinent information, including ready availability of medical records, relating to the 

health care of Mr. West. Kaiser’s conduct in its treatment of Mrs. Utterback, Mr. Spunbarg, and Mr. West was in violation of

the Act and constitutes cause for discipline by the Director of the Department of Managed Health Care pursuant to Health 

and Safety Code section 1386.

PARTIES

1. Joan W. Cavanagh ("complainant") is the Assistant Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement of the Department of 

Managed Health Care. Complainant brings this action solely in her official capacity as Assistant Deputy Director, Office of 

Enforcement.

2. At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, Kaiser has been a health care service plan as defined by the Act. Kaiser 

is the holder of health care service plan license no. 933-0055, which was issued on November 4, 1977 by the 

Commissioner of Corporations of the State of California.3 Kaiser is subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act. Kaiser’s 

principal corporate office is located at 1800 Harrison Street, 8th Floor, Oakland, California 94612.

3.Until July 1, 2000, health care service plans were licensed by the Department of Corporations and subject to DOC’s 

regulatory jurisdiction. Effective July 1, 2000, the Department of Managed Health Care succeeded to allduties, powers, 

responsibilities and jurisdiction of the Department of Corporations regarding the Department of Corporation’s Health Plan 

Program, health care service plans and the health care service plan business. Health & Safety Code § 1341.9. As of 

January 1, 2001, the Department of Managed Care is now known as the Department of Managed Health Care.


JURISDICTION

3. This Second Amended Accusation is brought before the Director of the Department of Managed Health Care (the 

"Department") under the authority of the following sections of the Health and Safety Code and the rules and regulations 

promulgated thereunder at title 10, California Code of Regulations (the "Rules").

4. Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1341, the Director is vested with the responsibility for administration and 

enforcement of the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder. The statutory mission of the Department as set forth in 

Health and Safety Code section 1341(a), is to ensure that health care service plans provide enrollees with access to 

quality health care services and to protect and promote the interests of enrollees.

5. Health and Safety Code section 1386(a) authorizes the Director to take disciplinary action against a health care service 

plan, including, but not limited to, the assessment of administrative penalties against the plan, if the Director determines, 

after appropriate notice and opportunity for a hearing, that the plan has committed any of the acts or omissions which 

constitute grounds for disciplinary action pursuant to the provisions of the Act.

6. Health and Safety Code section 1386(b)(6) provides that the Director may take disciplinary action against a plan when 

"[t]he plan has violated or attempted to violate, or conspired to violate, directly or indirectly, or assisted in or abetted a 

violation or conspiracy to violate any provision of this chapter, any rule or regulation adopted by the director pursuant to 

this chapter, or any order issued by the director."

7. As set forth below, complainant alleges that Kaiser has violated or continues to violate, Health and Safety Code sections 1367(d), 1367(e)(1), 1367(i),

1368.01(a) and 1368.04(b) and California Code of Regulations, title 10, sections 1300.67,1300.67(g), 1300.67.1, 1300.67.1(a), 1300.67.1(c), 1300.67.1(d), 1300.67.1(e),1300.67.2, 1300.67.2(c), 1300.67.2(d) and 1300.68.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Margaret Utterback

8. On January 26, 1996, Margaret Utterback, a 74-year-old member of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. experienced a 

ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm ("AAA") at Kaiser Hospital in Hayward after attempting to see a physician for more 

than eight hours. The rupture occurred an hour after the initial diagnosis. Due to the fact that there was a unreasonable 

delay in getting Mrs. Utterback transported a mere one and one half miles from a Kaiser clinic to the Kaiser emergency 

room, the subsequent eight hour surgery which included transfusion of more than 20 units of blood proved futile. Mrs. 

Utterback died approximately 36 hours later in the critical care unit ("CCU").

9. On January 26, 1996, Mrs. Utterback woke up suffering from right abdominal pain radiating to her back. The pain 

persisted throughout the entire day as she attempted to be seen by her Kaiser physician. She made continual efforts to 

obtain an appointment with her primary care physician. In doing so, Mrs. Utterback faithfully utilized the Hayward phone 

system and waited more than four hours to hear back from her physician, who answered her request to be seen with a 

prescription for a narcotic pain medication. After Mrs. Utterback refused the pain medication and insisted on being 

examined, her daughter drove her to Kaiser’s Point Eden medical facility in Hayward at least one hour early for her 

appointment, where Mrs. Utterback sat in the waiting room, moaning in obvious physical distress. Even though the 

receptionist was asked several times by her daughter to try to work Mrs. Utterback in earlier due to her mother’s severe 

pain, Kaiser nevertheless failed to have her examined by a doctor or nurse until approximately 4:30 p.m., 15 minutes after 

her scheduled appointment.

10. Her condition was diagnosed promptly once she was seen. The aneurysm was large, approximately 10 cm in size, 

and could easily be detected by touch by a physician during a physical exam. Even after Mrs. Utterback was determined to

be suffering from an dissecting abdominal aortic aneurysm ("AAA"), Kaiser failed to take prompt action to carry out the 

emergency surgery she needed. Instead, a non-emergency ambulance was ordered to take Mrs. Utterback from Point 

Eden Clinic to the Kaiser Hospital in Hayward at the height of rush-hour traffic. Moments after arriving at the Kaiser 

Hospital emergency room in Hayward, Mrs. Utterback’s blood pressure "crashed", which indicated that her aneurysm had 

ruptured. By the time Mrs. Utterback was finally taken to emergency surgery minutes later, it was too late to perform 

surgery that would ultimately save her life.

11. The aneurysm burst at approximately 5:45 p.m. After surgery to attempt to repair the ruptured aneurysm, Mrs. 

Utterback was sent to CCU and never regained full consciousness before dying 36 hours later.

12. Mrs. Utterback’s medical records indicate that there was an abnormality in her abdominal aorta as much as 10 years 

earlier that was never followed up or investigated.

B. Wolfgang Spunbarg

13. Wolfgang Spunbarg, a 72-year old Kaiser enrollee, was taken to the Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department 

by his wife, Edith Spunbarg, on April 25, 2000. Mr. Spunbarg told his wife that he was experiencing severe pain in his 

testicles and abdomen.

14. Upon arrival, Mr. Spunbarg walked into the emergency department while his wife parked the car. When Mrs. Spunbarg 

walked in the Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department, she saw her husband sitting in the waiting area with other 

people. According to medical records he checked in at 11:27 p.m. on April 25, 2000. However, he did not receive an initial

exam until 11:45 p.m.

15. Mrs. Spunbarg told the receptionist in the emergency department that her husband had problems with his heart, was 

taking medication, and should be seen immediately. Mrs. Spunbarg was told by the receptionist that the emergency 

department was too busy and Mr. Spunbarg would have to wait.

16. Mr. Spunbarg remained in the waiting area of the emergency department for a minimum of eighteen minutes before 

he was seen by a health care professional. During that time he was in severe pain and was making a moaning sound 

audible to other people in the waiting area.

17. Dr. Mona Balogh was summoned by Mrs. Spunbarg while Dr. Balogh was talking to another patient. Dr. Balogh told a 

nurse to assist Mr. Spunbarg. When the nurse arrived she argued with Mrs. Spunbarg for a period of time before checking 

Mr. Spunbarg’s vital signs for the first time at 11:45 p.m.

18. Thereafter, at approximately 11:50 p.m., Mr. Spunbarg became unconscious and collapsed in the emergency 

department. Emergency protocols were used in an attempt to save Mr. Spunbarg’s life. However, he never regained 

consciousness and Mr. Spunbarg was pronounced dead at approximately 1:21 a.m. on April 26, 2000. Mr. Spunbarg’s 

cause of death was listed as Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm.

C. James West

19. James West, a 62-year-old man, was diagnosed with a 6 cm abdominal aortic aneurysm on June 5, 1999.

20. Mr. West had a Kaiser primary care physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui, who referred him to Kaiser vascular surgeon Charles 

Reider for treatment of the AAA.

21. Mr. West met with Dr. Charles Reider on June 15, 1999 to discuss the AAA.

22. On June 21, 1999, while undergoing a catropil renal scan at Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital, Mr. West lost 

consciousness.

23. Mr. West was taken to the emergency department and admitted to Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital.

9 Second Amended Accusation

98-126, RGR

24. On June 22, 1999, James West was discharged from the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital without any further diagnostic 

testing of his AAA.

25. On June 23, 1999, Mr. West had an aortography and iliac angiogram as an outpatient at Kaiser Walnut Creek by Dr. 

Ho.

26. On June 25, 1999, Mr. West arrived at a scheduled appointment with his primary care physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui. Dr. 

Nauqui did not have James West’s medical chart and had no knowledge of Mr. West’s hospitalization on June 21 and 

June 22.

27. On June 25, 1999, Mr. West also had an appointment with Dr. Reider. Dr. Reider had no knowledge or information 

regarding James West’s hospitalization on June 21.

28. On June 27, 1999, Mrs. West took her husband, Mr. West, to the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital emergency room due 

to severe abdominal pain.

29. A CT scan was performed on Mr. West at the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital by Dr. Victoria Flavell. The test showed 

the aneurysm was now 6.8 cm.

30. On June 28, 1999, Mrs. West saw Dr. Charles Reider in a hallway of the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital. Dr. Reider 

was the on-call vascular surgeon for the Kaiser Walnut Creek Hospital on June 28, 1999. Dr. Reider told Mrs. West that he 

had not been informed that his patient, Mr. West, had been hospitalized on June 27, 1999.

31. Dr. Charles Reider told Mrs. West that he was currently on his way to perform surgery on another patient, but would 

check on Mr. West when he was finished.

32. While Dr. Charles Reider was in surgery with the other patient, Mr. West was found pulseless and unresponsive in his 

bed. The diagnosis was a ruptured AAA.

10 Second Amended Accusation

98-126, RGR

33. Mr. West was rushed to the operating room where Dr. Charles Reider performed an attempt at abdominal aortic 

aneurysm repair.

34. Mr. West never regained consciousness and died on June 29, 1999.

35. Dr. Syed Nauqui, Mr. West’s primary care physician, was not notified of James West’s hospitalization on June 27, 

1999 until after he expired.

FIRST CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE (RESPONDENT HAS VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO CARE)

36. Health and Safety Code section 1367(e)(1) states that "All services shall be readily available at reasonable times to 

all enrollees. To the extent feasible, the plan shall make all services readily accessible to all enrollees."4

37. Rule 1300.67.2 sets forth the standard for health plans to meet regarding access to care.5

4 Also, Health and Safety Code section 1367(f) requires a plan to employ and utilize allied health manpower for the furnishing of services to the extent permitted by law and consistent with good medical practice.

5 Rule 1300.67.2 states:

Within each service area of a plan, basic health care services and specialized health care services shall be readily available and accessible to each of the plan's enrollees;

(c) Emergency health care services shall be available and accessible within the service area twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week;

(d) The ratio of enrollees to staff, including health professionals, administrative and other supporting staff, directly or through referrals, shall be such as to reasonably assure that all services offered by the plan will be accessible to enrollees on an appropriate basis without delays detrimental to the health of the enrollees. There shall be at least one full-time equivalent physician to each one thousand two hundred

(1,200) enrollees and there shall be approximately one full-time equivalent primary care physician for each two thousand (2,000) enrollees, or an alternative mechanism shall be provided by the plan to demonstrate an adequate ratio of physicians to enrollees.


Utterback

38. Kaiser failed and/or continues to fail to provide enrollees with access to care in the following respects (each act forms 

an independent basis for assessment of a penalty):

(a) The Kaiser telephone call center does not have a triage system for AAA thereby failing to ensure that all enrollees are 

receiving all services in a readily accessible manner;

(b) Enrollees who telephone the call center are not allowed to be transferred to their physicians or to the physicians’ 

nurses, thereby not providing services to all enrollees in a readily accessible manner;

(c) Every time an enrollee telephones, the Kaiser call system is such that the enrollee reaches a different medical assistant  
("M.A.") each time and there is no way to determine what efforts were made, if any, by the prior M.A.s to provide the 

enrollee with services, such as appointments and access to advice nurses thereby failing to assure that all enrollees are 

receiving all services in a readily accessible manner;

(d) The Kaiser appointment system does not have the means to prioritize same day appointments thereby failing to ensure

that all enrollees are receiving all services in a readily accessible manner;

(e) There are no guidelines for how e-mail messages are prioritized or processed once they have been sent to the clinic;

(f) When an enrollee arrives at a clinic earlier and announces to the receptionist and/or M.A. that he/she is in pain and 

would like to be put in a room, lay down and/or be seen earlier, there is no Kaiser system in place to ensure that the 

enrollee is triaged by an R.N. and/or a physician thereby failing to ensure that all enrollees are receiving all services in a 

readily accessible manner;

(g) No medical professional spoke to and/or had any contact with Mrs. Utterback for approximately eight hours after her 

first attempt to get assistance thereby failing to ensure that all services to Mrs. Utterback were available in a readily 

accessible manner;

(h) Mrs. Utterback’s complaints and desires were communicated only to M.A.s who are not medically trained to perform 

medical triage on a patient thereby failing to ensure that all services provided to Mrs. Utterback were available in a readily 

accessible manner; and,

(i) Kaiser failed to maintain the appropriate enrollee to staff ratios at Medical Station 6 on or about January 26, 1996.

Spunbarg

39. In the case of Mr. Spunbarg, Kaiser failed, and continues to fail, to provide available and accessible emergency health 

care services at the Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department (each act forms an independent basis for assessment 

of a penalty):

(a) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department was closed due to saturation6 when Mr. Spunbarg arrived for services;

(b) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department closes due to saturation on an average of two days per week;

(c) Enrollees who arrive at the Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department are not advised by Kaiser when the 

emergency department is closed due to saturation; and,

(d) Kaiser Woodland Hills utilizes a receptionist, untrained in health care, to make an initial assessment of a newl y 

arriving enrollee that otherwise should be seen by a health care professional.

SECOND CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE

(RESPONDENT HAS VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO PROVIDE CONTINUITY OF CARE)

40. Health and Safety Code section 1367(d) requires that the plan furnish services in a manner providing continuity of care 

and ready referral of patients to other providers at times as may be appropriate consistent with good professional 

practice.

41. Rule 1300.67.1 sets forth the standard for health plans to meet with respect to continuity of care.7

6 A term meaning all beds are full and no ambulance transport patients will be accepted.

7 Rule 1300.67.1 states:

Within each service area of a plan, basic health care services shall be provided in a manner which provides continuity of care, including but not limited to:

(a) The availability of primary care physicians, who will be responsible for coordinating the provision of health care services to each enrollee;

(c) The maintenance and ready availability of medical records, with sharing within the plan of all pertinent information relating to the health care of each enrollee;

(d) The maintenance of staff, including health professionals, administrative and other supporting staff, directly or through an adequate referral system, sufficient to assure that health care services will be provided on a timely and appropriate basis to enrollees.

14 Second Amended Accusation

98-126, RGR

Utterback

42. Kaiser failed and/or continues to fail to provide enrollees with continuity of care in the following respects (each act 

forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty):

(a) The Kaiser call center does not have a triage system for AAA thereby failing to ensure that all enrollees are receiving 

all services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers which are appropriate and 

consistent with good professional practice;

(b) No one, based on Mrs. Utterback’s symptoms, advised her to go to the emergency room thereby failing to ensure that 

Kaiser furnished services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers which would have 

been appropriate and consistent with good professional practice;

(c) Expecting M.A.s (as opposed to R.N.s or physicians) to ask enrollees appropriate questions in order to send medically 

sound e-mail messages to physicians fails to ensure that Kaiser furnishes services in a manner providing continuity of 

care;

(d) No medical professional spoke to and/or had any contact with Mrs. Utterback for approximately eight hours after her 

first attempt to get assistance thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser furnished services in a manner providing continuity of 

care with ready referral to other providers which would have been appropriate and consistent with good professional 

practice;

(e) There is no documentation that Mrs. Utterback was offered an appointment with another physician. Even if she had 

been, it would have been in violation of Kaiser’s own Appointment Guidelines, thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser 

furnished services in a manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers which would have been 

appropriate and consistent with good professional practice; and,

(f) On January 26, 1996, Mrs. Utterback’s complaints and desires were communicated only to M.A.s who are not 

medically trained to perform medical triage on a patient thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser furnished services in a 

manner providing continuity of care with ready referral to other providers, such as those available in the emergency 

department, which would have been appropriate and consistent with good professional practice.

43. Kaiser fails to maintain and have medical records readily available, with sharing within the Kaiser system of all 

pertinent information relating to the health care of each enrollee in at least the following four ways:

(a) The advice nurses have no medical charts available to them at the Call Center so that adequate information cannot 

either be evaluated by the R.N. or communicated to the physician;

(b) When physicians receive e-mail messages from the Call Center or the enrollee is able to secure a same day 

appointment, the medical chart is not available on the premises for the physician to review prior to rendering medical care 

or a medical opinion to the enrollee; and

(c) The e-mail that described Mrs. Utterback’s symptoms, which indicated that a prescription for a narcotic was 

prescribed when Mrs. Utterback was specifically seeking access to care by way of an appointment, is omitted from the 

medical chart.

44. Kaiser failed to monitor the follow up of Mrs. Utterback’s health care documentation.

(a) When Mrs. Utterback’s medical records revealed abnormalities in her chest x-rays, her primary care physicians failed 

to follow up on the radiologists’ comments thereby failing to ensure that Kaiser furnished services in a manner providing 

continuity of care with ready referral to

other providers which would have been appropriate and consistent with good professional practice. Expecting M.A.s (as 

opposed to R.N.s or physicians) to ask enrollees appropriate questions in order to send medically sound e-mail 

messages to physicians fails to ensure that Kaiser furnishes services in a manner providing continuity of care.

Spunbarg

45. Rule 1300.67.1(d) provides that within each service area of a plan, basic health care services8 shall be provided in a 

manner which provides continuity of care, including but not limited to the following subdivision:

"(d) The maintenance of staff, including health professionals, administrative and other supporting staff, directly or through 

an adequate referral system, sufficient to assure that health care services will be provided on a timely and appropriate 

basis to enrollees."

46. Kaiser failed to maintain sufficient health care professional staff to assure that health care services were being 

provided on a timely and appropriate basis and consistent with good professional practice to Mr. Spunbarg (each act 

forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty):

(a) Kaiser health care professionals failed to assess the condition of Mr. Spunbarg for 18 minutes after he arrived at the 

emergency department because of insufficient staffing at the Kaiser Woodland Hills facility;

(b) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department was closed due to saturation at the time Mr. Spunbarg arrived;

(c) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department closes due to saturation two days per week on average; and,

8 "Basic Health Care Services" is defined in Health and Safety Code section 1345(b) and includes emergency health care services in 1345(b)(6).

(d) Kaiser Woodland Hills Emergency Department requires a receptionist to triage patients when they first arrive.

West

47. Rule 1300.67.1(c) and (e) provides for,

(c) The maintenance and ready availability of medical records, with sharing within the plan of all pertinent information 

relating to the health care of each enrollee;

(e) An adequate system of documentation of referrals to physicians or other health professionals. The monitoring of the 

follow up on enrollees’ health care documentation shall be the responsibility of the health care service plan and associated 

health professionals.

48. Kaiser failed to maintain and have readily available medical records, with sharing within the plan of all pertinent 

information relating to the health care of Mr.

West.

(a) Kaiser failed to share information of Mr. West’s hospitalization on June 21 and June 22, 1999 with his primary care 

physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui.

(b) Kaiser failed to share information of Mr. West’s hospitalization on June 21 and June 22, 1999 with his vascular 

surgeon, Dr. Charles Reider.

(c) Kaiser failed to make Mr. West’s medical records available for his appointment on June 25, 1999 with his primary care 

physician, Dr. Syed Nauqui.

(d) Kaiser failed to share information on James West’s hospitalization on June 27, 1999 with his primary care physician, 

Dr. Syed Nauqui.

(e) Kaiser failed to share information of Mr. West’s hospitalization on June 27, 1999 with his vascular surgeon, Dr. 

Charles Reider.

49. Kaiser fails to have an adequate system in place for the maintenance and ready availability of medical records with 

sharing within the plan of all pertinent information relating to the health care of each enrollee.

(a) Kaiser fails to have a system in place in which pertinent information of enrollees with "high risk" medical condition can 

be shared within the plan on a timely basis.

THIRD CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE

(RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY CARE SERVICES)

50. Health and Safety Code section 1367(i) states as follows, "Each health care service plan contract shall provide to 

subscribers and enrollees all of the basic health care services included in subdivision (b) of Section 1345…."

51. Rule 1300.67 states: Scope of Basic Health Care Services

The basic health care services required to be provided by a health care service plan to its enrollees shall include, where 

medically necessary…:

(g) Emergency health care services which shall be available and accessible to enrollees on a twenty-four hour a day, 

seven days a week, basis within the health care service plan area. Emergency health care services shall include 

ambulance services for the area served by the plan to transport the enrollee to the nearest twenty-four hour emergency

facility with
physician coverage, designated by the Health Care Service Plan.

52. Kaiser failed and/or continues to fail to provide enrollees with emergency care in the following respects (each act 

forms an independent basis for assessment of a penalty):

(a) No protocols or guidelines exist for Kaiser Hayward clinics with regard to when 911 should be activated as opposed to 

an in-house call to a "hub" to contact "emergency" transport. The lack of guidelines fails to ensure that services are 

available and accessible to enrollees twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, within the health care service plan area;

(b) Not having protocols in place from 1996 through the present, regarding the use of the most emergent transportation 

available to transport patients when needed to the Hayward Emergency Department, fails to ensure that services are 

available and accessible to enrollees twenty-hour hours a day, seven days a week, within the health care service plan area;

and,

(c) In the case of Mrs. Utterback, who was suffering from a dissecting AAA, Kaiser failed to provide emergency health 

care services, including the appropriate ambulance services for the area served by the plan, to transport her to the nearest 

twenty-four hour emergency facility with physician coverage in a timely manner. This failure to utilize the proper emergency

transport failed to ensure that all health care services were available to Mrs. Utterback in a readily accessible manner as 

required by the Act.

FOURTH CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE

(RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROMPTLY AND REASONABLY RESOLVE THE FAMILY’S GRIEVANCE)

53. Health and Safety Code section 1368.01 (for years 1996-1999)9 stated:

(a) The grievance system shall require the plan to resolve grievances within 30 days whenever possible and shall require 

the plan to provide enrollees and subscribers with a written statement on the disposition or pending status of the grievance

within 30 days of the plan’s receipt of the grievance.

54. Rule 1300.68. Grievance System A plan grievance system established pursuant to the requirement of Section 1368 of 

the Act shall include at least the following features:

(a) The system shall be established, pursuant to written procedures, for the receipt, handling and disposition of complaints. 

An officer of the plan shall be designated as having primary responsibility for the maintenance of such procedures and for 

the review of their operations and for the utilization of any emergent patterns of grievances in the formulation of policy 

changes and procedural improvements in the plan's administration.

9 The current version of Health and Safety Code section 1368.01(a) is as follows:

22 Second Amended Accusation

98-126, RGR

(e) Complaint forms and a copy of the grievance procedure shall be readily available at each facility of the plan and the 

plan shall provide them to subscribers and enrollees promptly upon receipt of a request.

(g) A grievance system shall provide (1) for the acknowledgment of the receipt of a complaint and notice to the 

complainant of who may be contacted with respect to the complaint within 20 days, and (2) for notice and a written 

statement to the complainant of the disposition or pending status of the complaint within 30 days of the plan's receipt of the 

complaint. Where the plan is unable to distinguish between complaints and inquiries, they shall be considered complaints.

(h) A grievance system shall provide for a prompt review of complaints by the management or supervisory staff 

responsible for the services or operations which are the subject of the complaint.

55. Kaiser failed to provide Mrs. Utterback with an adequate grievance system in the following manner (each act forms an 

independent basis for assessment of a penalty):

(a) The grievance system shall require the plan to resolve grievances within 30 days.

23 Second Amended Accusation

98-126, RGR

(a) The complaint was not resolved in 30 days. In fact, to this date, the complaint continues to be unresolved;

(b) The Kaiser grievance system was not established, pursuant to written procedures, for the receipt, handling and 

disposition of complaints. In 1996, there was no officer of Kaiser that was designated as having primary responsibility for 

the maintenance of such procedures and for the review of their operations and for the utilization of any emergent patterns 

of grievances in the formulation of policy changes and procedural improvements in Kaiser’s administration;

(c) Complaint forms and a copy of a grievance procedure were not made available to the Utterback family. Instead, the 

Utterback family had to create their own letter explaining its complaint;

(d) In the Utterback situation, the grievance system failed to provide (1) the acknowledgment of the receipt of a complaint 

and notice to the family of whom may be contacted with respect to the complaint within 20 days, and failed to (2) give 

notice and a written statement to the Utterback family of the disposition or pending status of the complaint within 30 days of 

Kaiser's receipt of the grievance; and,

(e) Kaiser’s grievance system failed to provide for a prompt review of the Utterback family’s complaints by the 

management or supervisory staff responsible for the services or operations which are the subject of the complaint.

24 Second Amended Accusation

98-126, RGR

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, complainant prays that a hearing be held on the matters alleged herein and that following the hearing a 

decision be rendered by the Director of the Department of Managed Health Care assessing an administrative penalty 

against Kaiser Foundation Health Care, Inc. of ($1,100,000.00) One Million One Hundred Thousand dollars and ordering 

such other and further relief as the Director deems proper.

Dated: February 9, 2001

______________________________________

Rebecca G. Ruggero

Senior Counsel

Attorney for Department of Managed Health Care


Enforcement

1 Second Amended Accusation

December 27, 2000

Ellen Leonard, Senior Counsel

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

One Kaiser Plaza

Oakland, CA 94612

RE: Assessment of Administrative Penalty Against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

Dear Ms. Leonard:

The Department of Managed Health Care (the "Department") has concluded an investigation in the matter of Kaiser 

Foundation Health Plan, Inc. ("KFHP") and the inadvertent release of KFHP member’s confidential medical information by 

KP Online in August 2000. Kaiser Permanente Online is a website through which KFHP members can access health 

information, participate in discussion groups, make appointments and request advice from a nurse or ask questions of a 

pharmacist. On August 2, 2000, as a result of an error in a program created to send previously undelivered e-mail, e-mail 

messages intended for over 450 California KFHP members were mistakenly sent through the Kaiser Permanente Online 

service to the e-mail addresses of 17 other KFHP members. KFHP promptly reported the problem to the Department and 

contacted all of the involved members. The 17 members who were sent the e-mail messages reported that either they 

never received the messages or that they had deleted them.

The Department’s investigation has found that the error was inadvertent, that KFHP acted promptly to mitigate any harm, 

and has implemented corrective measures to reduce the likelihood of such an event happening again. Nevertheless, the 

Department has concluded that a violation of the Knox-Keene Act did occur.

Therefore, the Department finds that KFHP has violated Health and Safety Code Section 1386 (b)(15) and imposes an Administrative Penalty in the amount of

State of California

Gray Davis, Governor

Business, Transportation and Housing Agency

980 Ninth Street

Suite 500

Sacramento, CA 95814

916-324-3669

jnovello @ dmhc.ca.gov e-mail

Ellen Leonard

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

December 22, 2000

Page 2

$25,000.00. The amount of the fine is less than that which the Department would have otherwise sought had KFHP not 

been forthcoming about the incident, and had it not taken steps to remedy the problems resulting from the error. It is the 

Department’s understanding that KFHP has concluded that it is in their best interest, and the interest of its members, to 

resolve the matter at this time by paying the fine. Thank you for cooperation and speedy resolution of this matter.

Sincerely,

James Novello

Staff Counsel

Department of Managed Health Care


Enforcement


WILLIAM KENEFICK (#59588)

Acting Commissioner of Corporations

G. LEWIS CHARTRAND, JR. (#124389)

Supervising Corporations Counsel

REBECCA G. RUGGERO (#165581)

Corporations Counsel

JOAN W. CAVANAGH (#56708)

Senior Corporations Counsel

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS

980 9th Street, Suite 500

Sacramento, CA 95814-2725

Telephone: (916) 323-0435

Facsimile: (916) 323-0438

Attorneys for Complainant

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Accusation and Notice of Intent to Assess Administrative Penalties Against KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. (UTTERBACK).

Respondent

FILE NO: 933-0055

OAH NO:

ACCUSATION AND PETITION TO

ASSESS ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES

AGAINST THE LICENSEE

PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE

DATE:

TIME:

DEPT:

HEARING DATE:

TIME:

DEPT:

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98-126, RGR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

In The Matter of the Accusation and Notice of Intent to

Access Administrative Penalties Against

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Utterback)

I. Introduction ................................................1

II. Jurisdiction ................................................2

III. Statement Of Facts ..........................................3

A. Margaret Utterback ......................................3

B. Abdominal Aortic Aneurysms...............................4

C. The Morning Of January 26, 1996 And Mrs. Utterback’s

Calls To Kaiser .........................................5

D. The First Long Wait .....................................8

E. Mrs. Utterback’s Contact With Medical Professionals

Prior To Arriving At The Clinic And The Failure To

Follow Appointment Guidelines...........................10

F. The Long Wait At the Kaiser Clinic ......................10

G. The Rapid Diagnosis ....................................11

H. The Effect Of Kaiser’s Failure To Instigate Standard

AAA Protocols ..........................................13

I. The Rupture And The Emergency Surgery ...................14

J. Mrs. Utterback’s Last Hours Of Life .....................14

K. The Family’s Futile Attempts To Get Answers From

Kaiser Through Its Grievance Process ....................15

IV. Kaiser’s Violations Of The Knox-Keene Health Care Service

Plan Act And The California Code Of Regulations .............20

A. Kaiser’s Phone System, E-Mail System, Appointment

Guidelines, Understaffing And Lack Of Documentation

Created Barriers To Access To Care .....................20

i. Controlling Authority.............................20

a. Access To Care................................20

b. Continuity Of Care ............................21

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98-126, RGR

ii. Kaiser’s Phone And E-Mail System .................21

iii. Kaiser’s Appointment System .......................23

iv. Kaiser’s Understaffing ............................24

v. Kaiser’s Inadequate Documentation .................25

B. Kaiser Failed to Provide Basic Health Care Services

Mandated by Knox-Keene.................................25

i. Controlling Authority For Preventive Care .........25

ii. Kaiser’s System For Providing Preventive Care......27

iii. Controlling Authority For Emergency Care ..........28

iv. Kaiser’s System For Emergency Care ................30

C. Kaiser Failed To Demonstrate That It Has

Organizational And Administrative Capacity To

Provide Services To Enrollees, Including The

Maintenance Of Medical Records .........................31

D. Kaiser Failed To Promptly And Reasonably Resolve The

Family’s Grievance ....................................33

V. Disregard For The Requirements Of The Act Make It

Necessary To Assess Administrative Penalties ................37

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

In The Matter of the Accusation and Notice of Intent to

Access Administrative Penalties Against

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Utterback)

Statutes

Health & Safety Code section 1345(b)(5)....................3, 25, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1345(b)(6)....................3, 28, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1367(e)(1)....................3, 20, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1367(d).......................3, 21, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1367(f).......................3, 20, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1367(g).......................3, 31, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1367(i).......................3, 25, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1367.69(b)....................3, 25, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1368.01(a)....................3, 33, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1368.04(b)................3, 33, 34, 38

Health & Safety Code section 1386.........................37, 38, 39

Regulations

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67 .......................................... 26, 29

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67(f) ........................................ 3, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67(g) ............................................ 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.1 ........................................ 21, 31

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.1(a) ...................................... 3, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.1(c) ...................................... 3, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.1(d) ...................................... 3, 38

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CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.1(e) .......................................... 3

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.2 ........................................ 20, 29

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.2(a) ...................................... 3, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.2(b) ...................................... 3, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.2(c) ...................................... 3, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.67.2(d) ...................................... 3, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.68 ........................................3, 34, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.70(b)(2)(G) ..................................... 27

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.70(b)(2)(G)(5) ............................... 3, 38

CA Code of Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 3

section 1300.70(b)(2)(G)(6) ............................... 3, 38

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98-126, RGR

The complainant, Commissioner of Corporations of the State of

California (the "Commissioner"), charges Respondent Kaiser Foundation

Health Plan, Inc., ("Kaiser") as follows:

I.

INTRODUCTION

1. This accusation seeks the imposition of a fine against Kaiser as an administrative penalty for systemic barriers to health

care services that caused the preventable death of one of its enrollees, Margaret Utterback, on January 28, 1996.


2. On January 26, 1996, Mrs. Utterback was experiencing severe pain relating to an abdominal aortic aneurysm. She was

exhibiting classic symptoms of the life-threatening condition, and her medical
history made her a likely candidate for this

condition. Even so, it
took Mrs. Utterback eight hours of continual efforts to obtain an appointment with her physician.

Within an hour of seeing her
physician her aneurysm burst. By that time, surgery was too late.

Despite transfusions of 24 pints of blood, Mrs. Utterback died in the
Kaiser Hayward Hospital Critical Care Unit ("CCU") a

day and a half
later.

3. While Mrs. Utterback’s efforts to see her doctor on January 26 were being hindered, other patients with relatively minor
complaints, such as "arm pain" and "right finger pain", were calling into Kaiser and received appointments to be seen by her doctor.

4. Mrs. Utterback had been a Kaiser patient for fifty years prior to her death. Her death is rendered more tragic by the fact 

that an abnormality in the area of her abdominal aorta is discernible in a Kaiser x-ray taken in 1986. During the subsequent

ten years, two different primary care physicians failed to provide preventive care that could have saved her life, and 

avoided her need for emergency services on January 26 that turned out not to be available.

5. This accusation is based upon Kaiser’s failure to provide Mrs. Utterback basic health care services, including both 

preventive and emergency care, its failure to make health care services reasonably accessible to her, and its failure to 

resolve her family’s subsequent grievance in a prompt and reasonable manner.

II.

JURISDICTION

6. At all times since November 4, 1977, Kaiser has been, and now is, a full service health care plan and the holder of a 

license (File No. 933 0055) issued by the Commissioner pursuant to the Knox- Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 

1975, Health and Safety Code section 1340 et seq. ("Knox-Keene Act"). Its principal corporate office is located at 1800 

Harrison Street, 8th Floor, Oakland, California 94612.

7. The Commissioner is vested with responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the Knox-Keene Act pursuant 

to Health and Safety Code ("H & S") section 1341 et seq. During an investigation into this matter, the Department of 

Corporations (the "Department") found evidence that Kaiser violated several Knox-Keene provisions as follows: a. Kaiser 

failed to ensure that subscribers and enrollees would receive available and accessible health and medical services 

rendered in a manner providing continuity of care (H & S section 1367(d), 1367(e)(1) and 1367(f) and California Code of 

Regulations, Title

10 ("10 CCR"), Chapter 3, section 1300.67.1(a), (c) and (d) and section 1300.67.2(a), (b), (c) and (d));

b. Kaiser failed to provide basic health care services including providing preventive care and emergency services(H & S section 1345(b)(5) and (6), 1367(i),

1367.69(b), 10 CCR sections 1300.67(f),

1300.70(b)(2)(G)(5) and(6));

c. Kaiser failed to demonstrate that the plan had the organizational and administrative capacity to provide services to enrollees (H & S section 1367(g)), which includes the maintenance and ready availability of medical records (10 CCR 1300.67.1(c)); and

d. Kaiser failed to act promptly and reasonably with regard to its grievance procedure (H & S Code section

1368.01(a), 1368.04(b), 10 CCR 1300.68).

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. MARGARET UTTERBACK

8. In January 1996, Margaret Utterback, 74 years old, and a Kaiser patient for 50 years, was still living in her home. She 

took reasonably good care of herself and was in generally good health up to the day she went to Kaiser with back pain that

radiated to the right side of her abdomen.

9. Her medical problems were few. She had suffered from hypertension for more than 30 years. She also suffered from 

minor ailments such as arthritis in her feet and skin lumps on her arms which her physician believed was sarcoidosis, a 

connective skin disorder. However, she was diligent in getting medical care when needed and carrying out follow-up visits.

10. Kaiser medical records indicate that Mrs. Utterback had been a smoker since the 1940’s and was diagnosed at 

Kaiser for atherosclerosis. She quit smoking approximately 2 years before her death in January 1996.

11. Mrs. Utterback had a family history of high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis. During all relevant times, medical 

records indicate that Kaiser was aware of this family medical history.

B. ABDOMINAL AORTIC ANEURYSMS

12. An abdominal aortic aneurysm ("AAA") develops when weakness in the wall of the aortic artery causes the vessel to 

swell. Rupture or threatened rupture of an abdominal aneurysm is a surgical emergency. If the vessel bursts, the patient 

can bleed to death in a short period of time.

13. The condition normally takes many years to develop. Typically, a developing aortic aneurysm will increase its diameter 

at a rate of approximately 0.5 c.m. per year.

14. Most cases of AAA are caused by arteriosclerosis. the formation of aortic aneurysms. Hypertension is one of the most

common conditions which increases the stress of the aortic wall.

15. For a patient who is asymptomatic, the diagnosis may first be suspected by an x-ray of the chest or abdomen, which 

will demonstrate a curvilinear calcification in the wall of the aneurysm. The diagnosis is confirmed by an ultrasound.

16. Generally, a symptomatic patient with AAA is an older person who complains of abdominal pain and back pain. 

AAA’s impinge on the lumbar vertebrae which is often responsible for lower back pain.

17. Surgery prolongs life by preventing rupture of the aneurysm. Symptomatic or expanding aneurysms should have 

prompt surgical correction.

18. Some patients with ruptured aneurysms survive long enough to become candidates for emergency surgical repair. 

These patients will usually present in shock and have severe pain in their abdomen, lower back, or both. A tender pulsatile 

mass may be palpated. The survival rate with emergency surgery in these circumstances is about

50 percent.

C. THE MORNING OF JANUARY 26, 1996 AND MRS. UTTERBACK’S CALLS TO KAISER

19. On January 26, 1996, Mrs. Utterback woke up with pain in her back which radiated toward her abdomen on the right 

side. She had been experiencing back pain since the day before and thought the pain was due to stiffness from previously 

sitting in a hard chair. The pain progressed that morning. She also experienced abdominal pain that she attributed to 

shellfish she had eaten the previous night.

20. At approximately 8:15 a.m., Mrs. Utterback called her daughter, Barbara Winnie, and asked her to come over because

she had experienced a sharp pain while coming out of her bathroom that morning.

21. When Mrs. Winnie arrived at approximately 9:30 a.m., she found her mother in bed, still in her pajamas. Although 

uncomfortable, Mrs. Utterback was not feeling the sharp pain that she had experienced earlier.

22. She reported to her daughter that she had tried reaching her primary care physician at Kaiser, Rod Perry, M.D., when 

the clinic opened at 8:30 a.m., and was on hold for so long that she decided to hang up. The phone number that Mrs. 

Utterback used to secure an appointment came from her address book under "Rod Perry."1

23. Between 9:45 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Mrs. Utterback tried to call Kaiser again. Mrs. Winnie overheard this conversation and was also informed of the details of the conversation afterwards. Mrs. Winnie essentially recalls this call as follows:

24. Mrs. Utterback explained her symptoms, that she was having pain on the right side of her back that was radiating to her 

abdomen, and asked if she could get an appointment to see her doctor. She was

1 The phone number for Dr. Perry previously was for his clinic directly, but later was "rolled-over" to the Hayward phone 

center that consisted of 5 to 6 different rooms of medical assistants ("M.A.’s") and/or registered nurses ("R.N.’s") at 

another Kaiser location. In other words, even though Mrs. Utterback used the phone number that had once been assigned 

to Dr. Perry, her call could be answered by any number of M.A.’s in a completely different building. In fact, the phone 

number could no longer connect Mrs. Utterback with Dr. Perry at Medical Station 6 in Point

Eden Clinic. All calls went to one of many phone rooms in the Kaiser Hayward Hospital that was approximately 2 miles 

from Dr. Perry at Point Eden Clinic, most of which were operated and occupied by medical assistants.

told by the person who answered the phone that there were no appointments available. Mrs. Utterback explained her 

symptoms again and asked if she could be put through to her doctor or the clinic so she could talk to someone there, but 

the person on the other end of the phone said that she could not do that. After that, the person said something to the effect 

that, "If you think that you need to be seen, call back at 3:00 p.m. and get an urgent care appointment for that evening." 

Mrs. Utterback was told that the urgent care clinic was the procedure to be used when there were no same day 

appointments available with her doctor.

25. After hanging up, Mrs. Utterback and Mrs. Winnie discussed the conversation and Mrs. Utterback decided to call back. 

Mrs. Utterback described her symptoms again to the new person who answered the phone, i.e., right side back pain that 

was radiating to her abdomen. After being transferred a couple of times, she finally was put in contact with someone whom

Mrs. Utterback thought was kind and willing to listen. This particular woman offered to send an e-mail message to Mrs. 

Utterback’s physician, Dr. Perry, about her wanting to be seen that day. Mrs. Utterback understood that once the e-mail 

was sent, she was to wait for her doctor to get back to her. Mrs. Winnie recalls that this conversation occurred at 

approximately 10:15 a.m. which is consistent with the time that the e-mail2 was actually

2 The actual e-mail message that was sent by a medical assistant is considered an official medical record which Kaiser 

has consistently failed to produce. E-mail messages are usually sent to the patient’s physician for him or her to decide 

what to do. The medical assistant sends the message from whatever phone room she is in, and it prints out at the 

physician station in hard copy on pink paper. Once the disposition is written on the hard copy of the e-mail message, this 

document is filed in the medical chart as an official medical record. E-mail messages are kept on the computer system for 

two weeks (and backed-up for 90 days). Even though the Utterback family members came to Kaiser to complain about the

needless death of their mother before the two week period expired, no one seems to be able to find

sent at 10:18 a.m.

26. Mrs. Utterback was not given an appointment during this conversation.

D. THE FIRST LONG WAIT

27. While waiting to hear back from Dr. Perry’s office, Mrs. Utterback reclined almost the whole time, but did get up at 

around 12:00 noon to have some soup that her daughter prepared for her. After not hearing back for nearly two hours, the 

two of them agreed that they would surely hear from Dr. Perry either during lunch or right after the lunch hour. However, 

when 1:45 p.m. arrived, Mrs. Utterback and her daughter agreed that "Enough is enough" and tried to call back to find out 

what, if anything, Dr. Perry had decided to do.

28. Mrs. Utterback called and explained to the person who answered the phone this time the steps she had taken up to 

this point in order to be seen by Dr. Perry. She again explained that she had right back pain radiating to her abdomen, 

which was getting more painful. She reiterated her efforts to see Dr. Perry and her symptoms as she was transferred 

several times. She also explained that she was frustrated, wanted a same day appointment and had been waiting to hear 

from Dr. Perry since 10:00 a.m. that morning. the message nor does it appear that an extra copy was printed within that two week period.

Mally Monton, M.A., the person who sent the message at 10:18 a.m. on January 26, 1996 had the opportunity to copy the 

message, verbatim, while she was questioned about the contents of it less than two weeks after the incident. This is the 

only copy of the message the Department has been able to obtain. The copy from which Ms. Monton wrote down the 

contents of the message was inexplicably thrown away in the trash moments later by her supervising nurse.

29. After speaking to several different people, it appeared to Mrs. Winnie that her mother had finally reached someone 

sympathetic based on the tone of Mrs. Utterback’s voice. Apparently, this person offered to transfer Mrs. Utterback to 

"Patient Assistance." However, when that transfer occurred, Mrs. Utterback reached a voice mail recording so decided to 

hang up.

30. Mrs. Utterback immediately called back the phone bank one more time, and after explaining her symptoms and all her 

futile attempts to get assistance again, she finally, after several attempts, reached a person who was able to get her 

scheduled for an appointment at 4:15 p.m.3 However, Mrs. Utterback had to insist on being seen that day because the 

medical assistant, at first, told Mrs. Utterback that Dr. Perry declined giving her an appointment that day, but opted to write 

her a prescription for narcotic pain medicine instead4. Finally, upon Mrs. Utterback's insistence, the medical assistant 

agreed to give her an appointment late in the day.

3 At all times, according to Kaiser’s own records, Mrs. Utterback never was connected to a registered nurse nor 

instructed to go to the emergency room. There is no evidence that Mrs. Utterback was offered an appointment with another

physician. In fact, it was in violation of Kaiser’s own appointment guidelines to have offered Mrs. Utterback an appointment

with another physician.

Most important, however, is that it is not unreasonable for a patient to want to see her own doctor. This value is reflected in 

the Knox-Keene Act where it assures that subscribers and enrollees receive available and accessible health and medical 

services rendered in a manner providing continuity of care (H & S section 1367(d) and 10 CCR section 1300.67.1(a) (c), 

(d), and (e)). Seeing one’s own physician who is familiar with one’s medical history is not to be minimized. For example, in 

Mrs. Utterback’s case, a physician who is aware of her history of high blood pressure, her smoking habits, her family 

history of deaths related to arteriosclerosis and her own history of atherosclerosis, coupled with Mrs. Utterback’s clear 

descriptions of symptoms that day, could have been armed with the information necessary to recognize that AAA was 

certainly a strong possibility.

4 The prescription was written either for Tylenol with codeine or Vicodin. The actual prescription is also missing.

31. Mrs. Utterback and her daughter decided to go immediately to the clinic in order to try to get in to see Dr. Perry sooner 

if possible. This is corroborated by Kaiser employee Kali Bell, the medical assistant who booked the appointment at Dr. 

Perry’s station, who recalls that the daughter told her that they were leaving right away to try to get worked in sooner that 

day.

E. MRS. UTTERBACK’S CONTACT WITH MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT THE CLINIC AND THE FAILURE TO FOLLOW APPOINTMENT GUIDELINES

32. Until arriving at the clinic, Mrs. Utterback never spoke to a registered nurse and/or "advice" nurse5 nor was she 

instructed to go to the emergency room by any Kaiser personnel.

33. Dr. Perry was the only licensed medical professional who knew of and/or otherwise had access to Mrs. Utterback’s 

medical history, knew of Mrs. Utterback’s symptoms stated in the e-mail message and her desire to be seen that day, yet 

his response was toprescribe Mrs. Utterback a narcotic pain medication.

F. THE LONG WAIT AT THE KAISER CLINIC

34. Mrs. Utterback left after 2:00 p.m. and checked in no later than 2:45 p.m.6 at the Kaiser Point Eden clinic. Despite 

requesting three separate times to be seen sooner because her pain was worsening, staff at Kaiser refused. While 

waiting, Mrs. Utterback’s

5 Advice nurses are registered nurses ("R.N.s").

6 Kaiser records indicate that Mrs. Utterback checked in at 3:32 p.m. The actual check-in time is still in dispute.

pain increased to the point where her discomfort was visually observable. She squirmed in her chair and held onto her 

side. At all times, Mrs. Utterback was in plain view of the reception desk and the open hallway where the medical 

assistants would come out to call patients into the back. Not until 4:30 p.m. did Dr. Perry examine her, 15 minutes after her 

appointment time.

35. At one point, the medical assistant who was "rooming7" for Dr. Perry’s patients that day, Fatima Mehrzad, was 

informed of Mrs. Utterback’s desire to be put in a room. Two Kaiser receptionists testified that Ms. Mehrzad came out to 

the front, glanced through Mrs. Utterback’s chart8, looked out into the waiting room where she was sitting and stated, "She 

doesn’t look that sick to me" tossed the chart back and walked away.

G. THE RAPID DIAGNOSIS

36. Once examined by Dr. Perry, he immediately diagnosed Mrs. Utterback with a dissecting9 abdominal aortic aneurysm 

("AAA"). The x-ray report at the time of rupture indicated that the aneurysm was at least 10 c.m. in diameter.

37. A dissecting AAA is a life-threatening condition that requires complete adherence to a stringent set of protocols in 

order to save the patient’s life. Pre-hospital treatment consists of relief of pain (morphine sulfate is recommended if 

diagnosis is

7 "Rooming" means placing patients into a physician’s assigned exam room.

8 The "chart" is what the clinic puts together in the absence of being able to btain the actual medical chart from the chart 

room which requires several hours otice. The information available to the rooming medical assistant is the atient’s name, 

age, address, Kaiser medical number, reason for being seen and the ppointment time.

9 Dissecting AAA means that the aorta was already splitting apart.

strongly suspected), immediate transport to hospital, decreasing the nxiety of the patient, gentle handling of p